Introduction
Interest in China's rising economic influence has come at a time when there is recognition that economic interdependence has also increased in recent decades. Similarly, the global financial crisis and its aftermath made clear that macroeconomic policies in large economies such as the U.S. create both real and financial spillovers that impact economies around the globe. Indeed, even before controversy erupted over whether the extraordinarily loose monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve in recent years generated negative outcomes particularly for emerging markets there was an ongoing debate which asked whether China was effectively exporting low inflation to the rest of the world. The impact of globalization more generally is not only apparent in the trading of goods and services but also in finance. Therefore, both real and financial shocks should be considered when one is investigating the aggregate relationship between these two large economies.
It would seem natural then to explore the links between China and the U.S. in a framework that not only recognizes their macroeconomic interdependence but one where real and financial shocks jointly play a role. This is the principal aim of this study. Relying on quarterly data since 1998 we estimate small scale models that economize on the number of variables employed and yet are rich enough to provide useful insights about spillover effects between economies. We are not aware of any extant study that considers the nexus between real and financial conditions, together with an attempt to measure the size of spillover effects, for both China and the U.S.
We simultaneously investigate the transmission of real and financial conditions between these two large economies and assess whether implications drawn from a modification to a standard macro model stands up to this kind of scrutiny. Juxtaposing China and the U.S. is of particular interest for several reasons. First, the issue of supply side shocks is nowhere more glaring than in dealing with China's growing global economic influence.
Second, whereas the U.S. has engaged in unconventional monetary policies over the past five years, while being constrained by the zero lower bound, China has not suffered the same fate. Third, in several respects, China is still an economy that possesses several of the features highlighted by Rey (2013) who supports as seemingly sensible the Chinese authorities' responses to the failure of floating exchange rates to deliver complete monetary policy independence. Hence, an empirical evaluation of spillovers and their macroeconomic consequences seems in order.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the extant literature. The methodology and some stylized facts are described in section three. We estimate dynamic factor models as well as factor augmented VARs to evaluate the size of potential spillover effects from the U.S. to China's economy. Empirical results are reported in section four prior to a concluding section that provides some policy implications and suggestions for future research.
Briefly, we conclude that inflation in China responds to credit shocks. Indeed, the monetary transmission mechanism in China resembles that of the U.S. even if the channels through which monetary policy affects their respective economies differ. Next, we find that the monetary policy stance of the PBOC was helpful in mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-9. Finally, spillovers from the US to China are significant and originate from both through the real and financial sectors of the US economy.
Literature review
China's macro economy has some unique features which, in principle, can potentially complicate any kind of empirical macroeconomic analysis. Among these, of course, is the level of state involvement in the macroeconomy, the type and management of the exchange rate regime, restrictions on capital mobility, to name but three such characteristics. In addition, there is the unusual structure of China's labour market.
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Until recently, some effort was devoted to asking whether and how inflation on a global scale was being influenced by rapid growth in China together with an exchange rate regime that exacerbated pressure on producers around the world to moderate price increases. For example, Bailliu and Blagrave (2010) find that foreign demand shocks impact China's economy more than those of in advanced economies. Eickmeier and Kühnlenz (2013) also report that, while Chinese aggregate demand shocks impact oil prices, global shocks play a relatively more important role in global inflation dynamics than do aggregate demand shocks that originate from China. The bottom line is that China's culpability in keeping world inflation rates low since the 1990s is not proven.
Turning to the conduct of monetary policy several authors have considered whether the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in China can be likened to that of Rogoff (2013)).
Data related considerations also loom large in any macroeconomic study of China's economy. There are two difficulties to contend with here. First, a reliable dataset is often restricted to data since the mid to late 1990s. Hence, researchers must generally work with fairly small samples. Perhaps unsurprisingly several studies, including ours, resort to variants of the factor model approach since this allows for the specification of rich but parsimonious specifications (e.g., see Fernald et.al (2014) , Liu and Zhang (2014) , He, Leung, and Chong (2013) ).
Second, there is the ongoing debate about the quality of Chinese data. Suffice it to say that there exists a vast literature that casts a negative view on the quality of Chinese macroeconomic data (e.g., see Holz (2013) , Sinclair (2012) , Burdekin and Siklos (2008) , and references therein). However, in spite of continuing doubts, the latest verdict about the usefulness of more recent aggregate data for China seems much improved. Thus, for example, Holz (2013 Holz ( , 2013a points out that even if the extraordinary growth numbers posted by China appear questionable (for example, see Wu (2011) ) there seems to be no evidence that the data have been falsified. Mehrotra and Pääkkönen (2011) In other words, the U.S. macroeconomic experience is similarly defined by unique features in the data. The Eurozone crisis would further contribute to keep not only policy rates low for the foreseeable future but stunt the emerging global economic recovery.
Clearly, there are challenges in estimating models for both large economies considered in this study. Nevertheless, the modelling of the interdependence of China's and the U.S.'s economies also reveals policy relevant questions about the level of cooperation or coordination at the international level.
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (hereafter GFC), the widely held view was that what is optimal for individual economies translates into the conclusion that international policy cooperation, if not coordination, is unnecessary. This view is associated with the work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) . We now know that the conditions required for such a result cannot survive the events of the past five years. Taylor (2013) documents how the NICE (near an internationally cooperative equilibrium) world came into conflict with the phenomenon now referred to as global spillovers. In particular, economic imbalances of the real and financial varieties can, and do, spillover, from one major economy to another and these should actually encourage as opposed to deterring greater cooperation in international macroeconomic policy making.
Taylor (2013) draws his results from model simulations which adhere to a modelling strategy that is broadly of the New Keynesian (NK) variety. Friedman (2013) , however, explains that this modelling strategy not only omits a role for the financial sector but that many interesting policy related problem cannot be properly answered in this framework. He proposes a simple modification to the NK model that adds a financial sector which gives rise to credit spreads as a means to introduce some impairment into the financial system to create the opportunity for spillovers into the real economy. The model, however, is tailored to the performance of the U.S. economy and international policy implica-9 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
tions are not drawn. Yet, the international dimension, in the form of volatile capital flows, to give one example, represents one such global factor. Research restricted to domestic factors ignores this element at their peril (Rey 2013) . As a consequence, her study advocates a macro-prudential response to the failure of floating exchange rates to insulate an economy from external financial shocks.
More recently, and for different reasons, Gordon (2013) and Eggertsson and Giannoni (2013) suggest that the omission of aggregate supply side influences, not to mention considerably more inertia than popular models are willing to admit, imply a failure of the NK view of the Phillips curve. One can well imagine that this kind of mis-specification is amplified in an open economy environment with international supply side shocks admitted into the model.
A parallel development in empirical models in recent years has been the attempt to ask the data to inform policy makers about the depth of interactions between economies as a way of assessing the importance of the phenomenon of globalization. Various types of factor models (e.g., Global VAR (GVAR), or Factor VAR models (FVAR)) and, more generally, models that are able to handle the over-parameterization that one risks to encounter, due to an imbalance between the span of typical macroeconomic time series and the number of available variables, have been proposed and implemented. Typically, the relevant empirical literature seeks to include as many economies as possible in recognition that even small economies may have effects on the rest of the world that can exceed their relative economic weight due to spillover and contagion type effects.
Nevertheless, as far as we are aware, there have been no attempts to investigate the role of economic interactions between large economies in the context of an ongoing literature that seeks to overcome weaknesses of the NK model while simultaneously capturing the potential spillovers stemming from volatile capital flows. This is the case whether or not the specification allows a financial sector to partially account for the transmission of shocks globally. While the story of global spillovers is plausible it must also confront the view that, conditional on the policy regime in place, pass-through effects have apparently diminished (e.g., see Bailliu and Murray (2010) , Takhtamanova (2008) , Globerman and Storer (2006), McCarthy (1999) ). This phenomenon may reflect the impact of globalization on the real economy and the adoption of inflation control regimes (e.g., inflation
targeting) in many parts of the world. It deals with the growth in trade of goods and services but does not consider the globalization of finance. will settle back to the consensus that prevailed during the height of the Great Moderation.
The asymmetry in economic conditions and structures between these two large economies
should provide an interesting test of the relative importance of real versus financial channels in the transmission of global shocks.
Methodology and data
The estimation approach consists in estimating a standard VAR followed by dynamic factor and factor-augmented or FAVAR models. (1) is separately estimated for data from each economy. 5 Typically, the contents of the vector would consist of real GDP growth or the output gap, the price level or inflation (in the GDP deflator or some equivalent), commodity or oil prices, and the central bank's policy rate. Equation (1) China. Equation (2) can be considered a benchmark model that captures the essence of real-financial links in either economy.
Next, we consider spillovers effects between the U.S. and China. To do so, and maintain the integrity of models such as (1) or (2), the following strategy is adopted. Suppose that we estimate U.S. and Chinese macroeconomic and financial conditions by creating two variables that proxy, respectively, the real and financial developments in each one of the two economies in question. In other words, instead of estimating equation (2) we are effectively blocking macroeconomic effects from China to the US. This is merely a simplifying assumption which can be relaxed. However, to conserve space, this restriction is maintained in some of the results reported below.
If still more parsimony is deemed desirable, we can replace y* CN with real and financial factors equivalents based on Chinese data only. In this case the following specification for China is estimated 7 We are, of course, implicitly assuming that these two factors are sufficient to explain the US (or China's) macroeconomy. While this is an empirical question imposing this kind of structure is sensible on purely economic grounds. The ability to estimate these factors is also predicated on the assumption that a large number of variables can potentially influence the real and financial sectors of either economy. 
where Γ is the vector of real and financial factors extracted from data from each economy.
Equation (6) is a dynamic factor VAR (DFVAR).
Of course, real and financial factors are unobservable while some policy variables (e.g., policy rates, money supply) are observable. In yet another variant, if the factors summarizing U.S. and China's real and financial conditions are summarized by Λ , then we instead can estimate the following specification written as X represent the observable policy variables for j= CN, US. Equation (7) is the dynamic factor-augmented VAR (DFAVAR) model. 8 Equation (7) may well be problematic if, a priori, one believes that monetary policy in China is passive, unlike the active role played, at least until recently, by the interest rate policy instrument in the US (i.e., the fed funds rate). In any event, we can still retain the essential structure of (7) by assuming that the only observable policy variable(s) are for the US. In this case we would rewrite (7) as (7) and (8) we effectively relax the restriction that shocks from China cannot influence the US economy. Like the estimates of real and financial factors described above the monetary policy factor is estimated via the method of principal components. To estimate the various foregoing specifications, in a first step, the first two principal components extracted from the data set 9 such that
where P is a (linear) transformation of the series, represented by j t Y that make-up the macro model and, as previously defined, Γ are the estimated factors while e is a zero mean, constant variance error term.
The recursive ordering assumes that Chinese block comes first so that U.S. shocks are relatively more exogenous than are shocks from China. Formulations (7) or (8) provide challenges, as noted above, since it is not obvious that there exists a clearly observable policy instrument even for the US post-crisis. In the case of Fed policy substantial changes took place after that central bank reduced the fed funds rate to the effective zero lower bound.
10 Thereafter, the myriad actions undertaken to ease credit and monetary conditions, since called QE, have led to a substantial expansion of the Fed's balance sheet.
A narrative history of recent monetary policy in China, briefly summarized earlier, suggests a multiplicity of policy instruments but where their relative importance may have changed over time. Accordingly, we assume that the nominal exchange rate, money growth, reserve requirements for financial institutions, credit or window guidance (i.e., base money growth) or, alternatively, either open market operations or the total assets of the PBOC, at one time or other represent the policy instrument for China.
In view of the above characteristics of China's monetary policy, as well as prompted by a need to economies on degrees of freedom (see below) we also rely on principal components analysis to create a monetary policy factor for China ( CN, φ
MP t
). For the US we use two observable indicators of policy, namely the fed funds rate, and the shadow rate after 2007 or the total assets of the Fed. 9 Continuing with our earlier example this would constitute 6 series. However, there is nothing preventing us from considering a larger set of data (see below). 10 As a result, there have been suggestions that a shadow fed funds rate better describes the state of policy ease for the US in recent years. Wu and Xia (2014) provides one illustration. We consider this possibility below.
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The data used are quarterly for the sample 1998. 
Empirical results
Since a variety of models are estimated it is useful to begin by providing additional details about the core and other series that are included in various specifications. In the case of China the core series used in the benchmark VAR model consists of real GDP growth, inflation (annualized) in consumer prices, an indicator of global commodity prices from the IMF, the real exchange rate and the growth rate (annualized) in base money. As noted previously alternatives were considered (e.g., a measure of the output gap instead of real GDP growth or an interest rate to replace base money growth). We comment below on the sensitivity of the results to these changes. For the U.S., following a long line of studies that es- China the additions recognize the role of reserve ratios and loans made by financial institutions as instruments of PBOC policy and as indicators of financial conditions. The same applies to the U.S. case which is inspired by relevant work suggesting that financial sector conditions are well proxied by these two variables (e.g., see Siklos and Lavender (2015) , and Lown and Morgan (2006)).
In deriving the real and financial factors via principal components analysis we considered several other variables, in addition to the ones described above. For China they are: an indicator of the business climate, a measure of property prices, share prices using the index for stocks in Shanghai, an indicator of energy consumption, the current account to GDP ratio, an indicator of economic policy uncertainty due to Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) adapted for China 13 , and the rate of change (annualized) in foreign exchange reserves. For the U.S. the following time series were added: real GDP growth forecasts from Consensus Economics, the term spread (10 year yield on U.S. government bonds less the yield on 3 month Treasury bills), an index of financial conditions published by the Chicago Federal Reserve, economic policy uncertainty, and housing prices (National Housing Price index). Together with the core series listed above these series combine to form the basis of the principal components analysis used to extract the real and financial factors (i.e., j t Γ defined above). Finally, the monetary policy variables for China used in the DFVAR and DFAVAR models consist of the required reserve ratio, credits from financial institutions and money base growth. 14 In the case of the U.S., X (see equation (8)) is given either by the fed funds rate or the fed funds rate replaced by its shadow rate after 2008.
15 13 The data are available from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/media/BakerBloomDavis.pdf. 14 We also estimated a version with the real exchange rate but the conclusions were unaffected. Hence, we did not pursue this version in estimating , MP CN φ . 15 We experimented with adding an indicator of changes in the size of the Fed's balance sheet to X (including a version deflated by U.S. GDP) but the results were inconclusive. This is not entirely surprising as the time series properties of this series make it a difficult one to deal with. Hence, we did not pursue this line of enquiry.
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As noted above the sample limits the lag lengths that can be used in the various specifications considered. However, relying on the Schwarz or final prediction error (FPE) criteria it was generally found that all the specifications can be reliably estimated with 2 or 3 lags. Figure 1 shows a selection of impulse responses (IRFs) from the benchmark model for China which augments traditional a macro model with a proxy for developments in the financial sector. 16 To conserve space we omit discussion of U.S. results. These are relegated to an appendix. Tables 1 and 2 show selected estimates of spillover effects from U.S. macroeconomic policy on China's economy. Table 1 shows the case where the benchmark model for China is augmented with estimated real and financial U.S. factors (i.e., equation (8)). It is clearly seen that a rise in real economic activity in the U.S. positively impacts China's real GDP growth and inflation. A tightening of the financial sector in the U.S. is similarly seen as prompting a real appreciation of the renminbi. Table 2 presents spillover estimates for the case where the most parsimonious macro model is estimated (i.e., equation (6)). The results here are somewhat different from the less restricted model as no statistically significant links are found between real U.S. and
Chinese factors. Nevertheless, as in the case above, there is a small but significant cumulative impact from a change in U.S. financial conditions on financial conditions in China.
We also conducted a number of sensitivity tests (not shown tial real GDP. The overall conclusions were unchanged although the positive impact from a credit shock to China's real GDP becomes insignificant at all lags when output gaps replace real GDP growth (i.e., see Figure 1a ). We also replaced consumer price inflation in China with a retail price index or the GDP deflator. This change had almost no impact on the conclusions. To deal with the price puzzle we added inflation expectations, again relying on the Consensus inflation forecasts. The results shown above were unchanged except that the source of the price puzzle (i.e., top portion of Figure 1b Figure 3b . Impulse responses are somewhat sensitive to the replacement of the observed fed funds rate with the shadow rate. These reveal that the loosening of U.S. monetary policy had a greater impact when the shadow rate is used. Of course, since the shadow rate is derived and not observed this merely serves to illustrate that policy continued to loosen in the U.S. even after the zero lower bound was hit. As pointed out above we faced difficulties when using some proxy based on the rise in total assets of the Fed which are difficult to model in a time series framework. Finally, it is notable that while spillovers were found from the U.S. to China the reverse was not found. Hence, at least in the period investigated, macroeconomic conditions in China did not impact U.S. real or financial conditions. Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/ 2015
Conclusions
This paper has considered the interaction of shocks between the U.S. and China with a focus on macroeconomic spillovers from the U.S. to China. Spillover effects in the other direction, when permitted, were not found to be statistically significant. A second objective was to highlight the importance of recognizing not just real economic effects between the two economies but the need to condition models on the role of financial factors. Accordingly, we augment a standard small scale macro model with financial factors such as credit and, the case of the U.S., lending conditions as reflected in the Fed's loan officer survey.
The latter, in particular, have been found to be useful in improving our understanding of the impact of monetary policy (e.g., see Siklos and Lavender (2015) , Lown and Morgan (2006) ). Note: Based on select estimates of equation (6) 
